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March 26, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

FROM: David Klein ✓

SUBJECT: The Kohler-Semyenov Conversations

The main impression I take from the Kohler-Semyenov conversations is the fact that the Soviets are interested in talking further about Berlin and they are trying to explore the thinking behind the modus vivendi paper.

It is clear that Semyenov was instructed to explore the principal elements of the paper without, in any way, committing himself. That presumably is being left for higher Soviet authority.

One curious part of the conversation concerned the International Access Authority. Semyenov obviously was attempting to establish the seriousness of our proposal. Unfortunately I think he has the impression we are not really interested in it. Actually the International Access Authority is a good starting position for us and one which we should not drop prematurely.

The question then arises - where do we go from here. We obviously are heading into pre-summit discussions. I would think that the paper which the Secretary tabled in Geneva is adequate for the present phase of discussions. The revision which Henry Owen and I worked on, which incorporates some of the Soviet language, would seem appropriate for the next phase.


I do not know the thinking here but I would presume that perhaps the next phase might be a Rusk-Dobrynin exchange and during these conversations a revised modus vivendi paper might be tabled.

After that, perhaps another Rusk-Gromyko round, particularly if a summit meeting is in the offing.

As for a summit meeting, the conditions under which it is arranged are perhaps as important as the meeting itself. If the decision is taken to go to the summit, we must give the Soviets and the public the impression

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that we are going willingly and confidently, and are not being dragged. By the same token, we must do everything possible to avoid creating an impression of euphoria. The public should not become over-optimistic and by the same token the Soviets must clearly understand that the summit is not an instrument through which our rights are bargained away. This must be clear at the outset so there is no - to use an overused word - miscalculation. Otherwise we may have a repeat of the May 1960 fiasco.

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